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In emaneipatory fields, retlections about the notion of the good and the warrant of
freedom are tied logether. To consider women and men as free human beings implies
letting them enjoy equal aceess lo opportunities, resources and eapabilities that have
to do with the recognition of their personalities, and respect for their life options.
The protection offreedom requires a serious acknowledgement ofthe subject's
capacity for self-detennination to develop the particular conception of welfare
and the good life that is going to guide her. Kant is one of the philosophers
who has given profound consideration to the connection between freedom and
gOQÓnessin relation to human lives.
Among feminist philosophers, fOUTdifferent approaches to Kant's theory
have emerged. The frrst uncovers Kant's misogyny and analyses his relegation
of women to an inferior class of persons. It then concludes that his defense of
gender differences permeates the whole of his theory to the extent that it does
not allow for a feminist appropriation.1
The second approach is critical ofwhat they see as Kant's focus on uni-
versalization and his emphasis on autonomy over community. They portray his
moral theory as one which would have little of interest to say about such per-
sonal relationships as friendship and marriage. Thus, many of those who have
contributed lo the development of feminist ethics conceived of it as a counter-
point to Kant's moral philosophy. This is specially the case of the proponents
of the "care ethics" movement, for whom the object of feminist ethics consists
in the analysis of a specifically feminine way to deal with moral dilemmas.2
The third approach takes a quite different direction in that it purports to
draw heavily on Kant's conception of morality. It recognizes its debt to Kant
and defends the utility of his conception for feminism through a peculiar read-
ing of his conception of the free person.3 Finally, the fourth approach argues
I Sally Sedgwiek (1990): Can Kant's Ethies Survive the Feminist Critique? Paeifie
Philosophical Quarterly 71: 60-79. Robin May Sehott (1990): Cognition and Eros: A
Critique ofthe Kantian Paradigm. University Park, PA: Penn State Press.
2 Carol Gilligan (1982): In a Different Voiee: Psyehologieal Theory and Women's
Development. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. Annette Baier (1987): Hume, the
Women's Moral Theorist. In: E. Kattay; D. T. Meyers (Eds.): Women and Moral Theory.
Tolowa N], Rowman and Littlefield. Nel Noddings (1984): Caring: A Femenine Approaeh
to Ethies and Edueation. Berkeley, CA: University ofCalifomia Press.
3 Drueilla Comell (1998): At the Heart ofFreedom: Feminism, Sex, and Equality. Prineeton
N]: Prineelon University Press. Marcia Baron (1997): Kantian Ethies and Claims of
Detaehment. In: Robin May Sehott (Ed.): Feminist Interpretations oflmmanuel Kant.
University Park PA: Penn State Press, 145-170.
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that Kant's moral philosophy contains distinctions that can be of relevance to
feminist thinking. The heart of Kantian formal universalism is, under the latter
view, still an exceIlent way to frame and promote gender issues.4
This paper supports this latter view and thus, will illustrate how Kantian
ethics could benefit contemporary feminism, when correctIy understood. The
argument wiIl proceed in the foIlowing manner. First, I will deal with a non-
avoidable fact, Kant's misogyny, and cornment on the implications of his the-
ory of gender in the light ofhis defense offormal universalismo Second, Kant's
central ideas conceming freedom, goodness, and happiness will be introduced.
The aim of this section wiIl be to correctIy understand the core of the categori-
cal imperative. Third, I wiIl deal with Drucilla ComeIl's interpretation ofKant.
In her book "At the Heart ofFreedom", she employs a particular view of
autonorny and happiness that she attributes lo Kant, and then applies it to gen-
der issues. This paper argues that her reading of Kant is fundamentaIly rnis-
taken and, hence, that her conclusions in relation to ferninism are not truly
Kantian. FinaIly, the central argument - that the categorical imperative can
serve as an extremely helpful tool to evaluate gender issues - will be devel-
oped. This paper contributes to the effort to displace an aIl-too-cornmon but
misguided interpretation of the Kantian project among contemporary gender
approaches, and thus to the exploration of the ways in which ferninism could
benefit from Kant's moral philosophy.
Kant's theory of gender
Kant's moral philosophy aims to be a unique investigation of morallife. The
philosopher of K5nigsberg took it that there is morallife in ordinary sense, and
that there is a moral consciousness cornmon to all people and times, which is
independent of philosophical research. Philosophical analysis of moral life
does not add to nor rest from it. Ethics serves merely to clarify the essence of
morality, (Le., to define what it is, where it lies, and how it is possible). The
goal ofphilosophical study is thus to discover a secure guide to morality. Kant
conceived of his task as the isolation of the a priori, and therefore unchanging,
elements of morality. He talks about the conditions for the possibility of moral
life in a universal sense. In different societies there might be different moral
schemes, but if they aIl represent moral mIes, then it should be possible to find
out what they have in cornmon, that is, what it is that makes themaIl be moral.
His approach to morality refers to an ideal of general validity. The morallaw
must be entirely unvarying. That is why the "Foundations of the Metaphysics
4 Herta Nagl-Docekal (1998): Feminist Ethics:. How It Could Benefit from Kant's Moral
Philosophy. In: Robín May Schott, O.c. 101-124. Joan Tronto (1987): Beyond Gender
Difference to a Theory ofCare. Signs12/ 4: 644.
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ofMorals" starts by asking what "good" means universally, that is, which ideal
we all (women and men) have in mind when we use the term "good" in a moral
sense. His famous proposal is that ''Nothing can be called good without quali-
fication except a good will."s
It is then necessary to understand what a good will is. The answer, in
Kantian terms, is: A good will is a will that has as its intention (what 1 will to
do) tO'act according to duty, and as a motive (why 1 will to do it) to act out of
respect for the morallaw.Kant defended that women could not act in accor-
dancerwith the ideal type of morality. Only men, in his view, could act out of
respect for the morallaw, that is, only men could do good out of a sense of
duty. The details of his views, and the theoreticallabyrinths that sustain them,
cannot be elaborated here.
An abundant literature on Kant's misogyny is available, however, and
concems not only its influence on his moral thought but also central aspects of
his aesthetics, anthropology, and political theory. For the purposes of this pa-
per, it will suffice to transcribe some quotes that illustrate the point. Thus in
different occasions Kant wrote:
"1 hardly believe that the fair sex is capable of principies." 6
"A cultivated woman, with a head full with Greek, like Mrs. Dacier, or who likes to
engage in deep discussions on mechanics, like Marchess de Chíitelet, would also
have to grow beard; it would thus express better the kind of brainy thought they are
after." 7
"Never a cold and theoreticallesson, always about feelings and preferably as close as
possible to her conditions as sex." 8
"With regard to scholarly women, they use their books somewhat like a watch, that
is, they wear the watch so it can be noticed that they have one, although it is usually
broken or does not show the correct time." 9
"Woman is a domestic animal. Man walks ahead with his weapons in hand, and
woman follows him with the burden ofthe household equipment." 10
"Women avoid evil, not because it is unfair, but because it is ugly; virtuous actions
are for them those who are beautiful ... The female sex is insensitive to everything
that is duty or obligation .... They do a thing only because they like doing it, and the
skilllies in so ordering things that they like only what is goOO.,,11
The above are not the only sexist cornments Kant makes about the feminine
essential nature, women's lack of capacity to act morally, the kind of education
5 Irnmanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, AK, N, 392.
6 Kant (1965) Observations on the Feeling ofthe Beautiful and the Sublime. Berkeley CA:
University ofCalifomia Press, 132-33.
7Kant, Beobachtungen uber das Gefllhl des ScMnen und Erhabenen, AK, 11, 209.
8 Kant, o.c. Al(, 11,231.
9 Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Al(, VII, 307.
10 Kant, o.c. Al(, VII, 304.
11 Kant, Beobachtungen Uber ... , AK, 11,231 ff.
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they should receive, and the social role they should play. In different places in
his work one finds him considering that women constitute an inferior class of
human beings.12 Nor can he be excused as a product of his times. Many vindi-
cations of the abolition of sexism were active during the Enlightenment; one
has only to remember the works of Poulain de la Barre, Olympecde Gouges and
Mary Wollstonecraft, among othersY Furthermore, it is precisely against these
vindications that Kant adopts his point ofview.
There can be no doubt of Kant's misogynist character, nor of the sexist
element which grounds his conception ofwomen's morality. As we have seen,
he sets limits to women's capacity to enjoy an absolute good will, since it is
always to be expected that they (more frequently? always?) act according to
their inclinations, instead of by a strict sense of duty. Any reading of Kant's
moral writings, however, will also reveal that the ideal of good will (a will
which acts according to duty from duty) is extremely difficult to satisfy in men
as well. The reason being that even if they (of course!) have what is needed-
that is, the capacity to judge and act by general principies instead of by their
own inclinations- they do not always exercise it.
After all, there are also bad wills. Moreover, given the impossibility of
achieving the complete moral self-knowledge that characterizes Kantian ethics,
even ifthey act on their superior capacity, they can never be sure whether they
did so out of duty or by inclination when the action is in accordance with the
morallaw. In other words, men can never have knowledge of their own moral
quality; even if they behave rightly in a moral sense, they will never achieve
certainty of it. As a consequence of this qualification, fully displaying a good
will is, properly speaking, almost as difficult for men as it is for women, al-
though for different reasons.
Nevertheless, it is also true that Kant's view of women does not playa
merely anecdotal role in his philosophy. Rather it is an important piece in an
assembled system. Thus a good part of the system would be affected, were we
to revise that element. In this sense, numerous studies show that the open side
of Kantian ethics (emancipation, freedom, citizenship, rights, and the rest of
12 To prove this point, it would be necessary to draw on the implications that are contained
in the latter quote (i.e., the association ofwoman with the feeling ofthe beautiful rather than
with the notion of duty). The task exceeds the limits of this paper, but the following
references can be helpful: Ángeles J. Perona (1992): Sobre incoherencias ilustradas: una
figura sintomática en la universalidad. In: Celia Amorós (Ed.): Actas del Seminario
Permanente Feminismo e Ilustración 1988-1992. Madrid: Instituto de Investigaciones
Feministas de la Universidad Complutense, 235-244. Luisa Posada (1992):Kant: De la
dualidad teórica a la desigualdad práctica. In: o.c. 245-253.
13 To this respect, Alicia Puleo (Ed.) (1996): Figuras del Otro en la Ilustración francesa.
Madrid: Escuela Libre Editorial. Alicia Puleo (1993): La Ilustración olvidada: La polémica
de los sexos en el siglo XVIII. Madrid: Anthropos. Mary Wollstonecraft (1989): A
Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Buffalo NY: Prometheus Books. Miriam Schooner
(Ed.) (1972): Feminism: The Essential Historical Writings. New York: Vintage Books.
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the Enlightenment project) contrasts with a dark side that limits the enjoyrnent
of those realities by, among others, women.14
Kant's formal universalism
Denunciation of Kant's patriarchal construction of gender can nevertheless be
consistent with a defense of some elements ofhis theory. For, independently of
what Kant, himself, thought about gender differences, his moral approach pro-
vides feminism with important emancipatory tools. Why is Kant' s concept of
morality an interesting theoretical tool to analyze gender issues? Because it ap-
peals to universality. And the reason why a universalist ethics is interesting for
feminism lies in the fact that what it commands it commands for everyone,
men and women, equally. Thus, when women's inherent equality is recog-
nized, there can be no moral distinction attributed to gender differences. It is
this perspective which gives rise to ethical feminismo In any case, it would be
mistaken to suppose that Kant's view ofwomen could simply be excised from
his larger theory: that could then, so purified, simply be applied to women as
well as men. Such an attempt at purification would be as naive as it would be
futile, and would not yield conclusions of much value. For Kantian ethics ex-
hibits all of its liberating and emancipatory virtues only if we are ready to
squeeze it a little more to get at its real worth. The next section is devoted to
such a "squeezing method".
Third formula of the categorical imperative
Kantian universalism presents a unique formal rule to serve as the criterion by
which to judge whether the intention ofmy action (what I will to do) is in ac-
cordance with the morallaw (what I ought to do). The rule has the aspect ofa
categorical imperative and can appear under various formulations. The third
formula of the categorical imperative expresses the idea that we ought to act in
such a way that OUT will, being rational, could tum into a will that establishes
generallaws. The so-called principIe of the autonomy implies that the will "is
not being subjected simply to law, but is so subjected that it must be regarded
as giving itself the law, and for this very reason is subject to the law of which it
may consider itself the author". ]5
According to Kant, when the will acts in that way, it gives itselfthe law
(Le., it is autonomous). It is precisely because such a will doesnot take into
14 Robin May Schott (1993): The Gender ofEnlightenment. In: Ferninist Interpretations of
Immanuel Kant, O.C. 319-337. Ursula Pía ]auch (1988): lrnmanuel Kant zur
Geschlechterdifferenz. Viena: Passagen.
15 Kant, Grundlegung oo., Al(, IV, 431.
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account any particular interest, not even the agent's interest, that it can be uni-
versally lawgiving and ground an unconditional imperative. It is therefore pos-
sible that someone both accepts a law that he gives to himself, and at the same
time it be universally binding. Given that it arises not from the individual's de-
sire to satisfY a particular interest, it will be what any rational will ought to
will. As Kant says, what that will wills, will be párt of a universal kingdom of
ends that every rational being, precisely because he is rational, would also be
ready to will.
Thus, according to the third formula, the categorical imperative requires
that we respect the humanity inherent in every human being (Le., both in my
own person and in every other person). Now, the precept that the human person
ought to be valued always "as an end in itself' is linked to the recognition that
to be a person - contrary to being a thing - implies the ability to determine
one's own ends: "Reason, therefore, relates every maxim of the will as giving
universallaws to every other will and also to every action toward itself; it does
so not for the sake of any other practical motive or future advantage but rather
from the idea of the dignity of a rational being who obeys no law except that
which he himselfalso gives."16
Thus, the third formula of morality entails that to be a person means to
be competent to determine one's ends for oneself. The requirement to ac-
knowledge the other's capacity for self-determination leads Kantian ethics to
emphasize that lo act morally right is not merely to refrain from doing any
harm to others, but something else as well. In this respect, Kant defends that
the categorical imperative must not be confused with the "golden role", that is,
with the "do-as-you-would-like-to-be-done" principIe. The inadequacy of the
golden rule is that it saves us worrying about doing good to the others if we are
prepared not to ask them to do us any good. The quote, though long, is worth
mentioning here:
"A fourth man, for whom things are going well, sees that others (whom he could
help) have to struggle with great hardships, and he asks, 'What concem ofmine is it?
Let each one be as happy as heaven wills, or as he can make himself; 1 will not take
'anything from him or even envy him; but 10 his welfare or 10 his assistance in time of
need 1 have no desire 10 contribute.' If such a way of thinking were a universallaw
of nature, certainly the human race could exist, and without doubt even better than in
a state where everyone talks of sympathy and good will, or even exerts himself occa-
sionally 10 practice them while, on the other hand, he cheats when he can and betrays
or otherwise violates the rights of mano Now although it is possible that a universal
law of nature according 10 that maxim could exist, it is nevertheless impossible 10
will that such a principIe should hold everywhere as a law of nature. For a will which
resolved this would contlict with itself, since instances can often arise in which he
would need the love and sympathy of others, and in which he would have robbed
16 Kant, Gmndlegung oo.,Al(, IV, 434-435
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himself, by such a law of nature springing from his own will, of all hope of the aid he
desires." 17
To fully grasp the point at stake, we have to remember that while the search for
happiness is a "l}atural end", each person looks for happiness in her or his par-
ticular way. For Kant, happiness canoot be defmed in a manner that has.general
validity:
"There is one end, however, which we may presuppose as actual in'all rational be-
ings so far as imperatives apply to them, (Le., so far as they are dependent beings);
there is one purpose not only which they can have but which we can presuppose that
they a11do have by a necessity of nature. This purpose is happiness. ,,18 "But it is a
misfortune that the concept of happiness is so indefinite that. although each person
wishe,S to attain it. he can never definitely and self-consistently state what it is he
really wishes and wills. The reason for this is that a11elements which belong lo the
concept ofhappiness are empirical, (Le.• they must be taken from experience), while
for the idea of happiness an absolute whole, a maximum. of we11-beingis needed in
my present and in every future condition. Now it is impossible even for a m9st clear-
sighted and most capable but finite being to form here a definite concept of that
which he rea11yWillS.,,19
Thus Kant's argument rests in the observation that. while everybody has the
faculty of self-determination. each one applies it in a different manner, since
each one chooses his or her ends "in the dark".
Taken together, both claims - that it is not enough to just refrain from
impeding the other's happiness, and that each subject has a particular approach
to happiness - have the following consequence. It is a duty to support others in
the pursuit of their individual ideas of happiness (provided they are not against
the morallaw); we ought to help others achieve their happiness. Kant states the
idea that it is not enough to simply refrain from impeding the other's happi-
ness, and that one ought to actively contribute to its achievement and increase.
"Now humanity could no doubt subsist if everybody contributed nothing to the
happiness of others but at the same time refrained from deliberately impairing
their happiness. This is, however, merely to agree negatively and not positively
with humanity as an end in itself unless everyone endeavors also, so far as in
him lies, to further the ends of others. For the ends of a subject who is an end in
himself must, if this conception is to have its full effect on me, be also, as far as
possible, my ends.',zo
In sum, Kantian morality combines the following two ideas: On the one
hand, everybody has the faculty of self-determination so that each person
chooses his or her ends individually and looks for happiness in his or her par-
ticular way. On the other hand, any agent ought, when acting morally, to fur-
17Kant. Grundlegung ... , Al<..N,¡423-424.
18Kant, Grundlegung ...• Al<..N, 415.
19Kant, Grundlegung ... , Al<..N, 417-418.
20 Kant, Grundlegung oo., AK, N, 417-418.
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ther the others' achievement of happiness. Having dealt with some of the lead-
ing arguments conceming Kant's theory of morals, it is time to move to the
third question, namely, why ComeU's interpretation of Kant is misguided. As
mentioned in the introduction, I have chosen ComeU's view not only because
of its inherent interest, but also, speciaUy, as a paradigmatic case of the state-
of-the-art approach to Kant taken by many gender focused studies; an approach
I contend is flawed.
The tricky question ofthe agent's happiness
Drucilla ComeU presents her work, At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, Sex,
and Equality as a contemporary development of Kantian ethics. She supports
her appeal to Kant with an acknowledgement of the central role that autonomy
and freedom should play in individual action. For her, the recognition of
autonomy and individual freedom protect any agent from the illegitimate re-
strictions that other people might exert over her actions. The basic premise in
her argument is that the individual ordination of preferences is not to be dis-
cussed, for there is no cornmon instance from which to impose a unique vision
of the good. In other words, there is no universal criterion by which to judge
each subject's notion of goodness. ComeU's approach implies that the individ-
ual ordination of preferences is a question of taste, interest, or personal conven-
ience; hence, and translated into Kantian terms, a question more of inclination
than of rationality. Such an approach would neglect to ask why we have certain
preferences, as weU as whether their construction throughout time has been
rational. Unfortunately, ComeU's appeal to Kant is sui generis, to say the least.
Why? Because Kant combines in a coherent, albeit sophisticated, manner
the foUowing two theses. On the one hand, each subject has an individual but
indeterminate conception of happiness; thus the notion of good is individual -
as ComeU weU states. On the other hand, however, for Kant, a correct moral
action is never govemed by the agent's notion ofhappiness, for the agent ought
not to take into account her own happiness when judging what she ought to do.
As a consequence of these two theses, Kant sustains that although the content
of happiness is not universal, good moral action is one and the same for every
human being. In fact, that is exactly the essence of Kantian ethics: the claim
that the supreme principIe of morality is universal because the notion of good
is based on the agent's reason, not on her inclination towards happiness.
Henee, my eritieism of ComeU is that, against her purpose, her approach goes
directly against the essenee of Kantian ethics, (Le., forínal universalism). Since
formal universalism is the eore of Kantian ethies, it wiU be necessary to eon-
elude that ComeU's interpretation and use of Kant is fundamentally mistaken.




Comell's feminist project is inserted within a certain interpretation of the lib-
eral tradition, whose forefathers she locates in Kant, Rawls and Dworkin. Her
main concem is with women's freedom, over and above what has up to now
been the most frequent demand of feminism, Le., formal equality with men.
According to Comell we have to shift the focus so that instead of being con-
cerned with the kind of freedom that is necessary to be equal, we start focusing
on the kind of equality that is necessary to be free. It is about time that we talk
straight about women's freedom for, "a person's freedom to pursue her own
happiness in her own way is crucial for any person's ability to share in life's
glories."21 Comell defends that the notion of freedom includes the freedom to
conceptualize gender relations and to act in accord with thero, and especially
the freedom to react against any kind of enforced sexual choice or identity.
This extensive detinition of freedom is, according to her, based on the Kantian
conception of a free subject as a self-determinating agent.
In particular, it is based on the existence of what she calls, ''the imagi-
nary sphere". The imaginary sphere refers to a space where we (re)imagine and
(re)contigure ourselves, that is, a space that allows us to define and evaluate
who we would like to become. Comell's defense of ''the sanctuary of the
imaginary domain" explicitly buttresses the right to create ourselves as sexual
beings - much in line with Judith Butler's approach. Particularly, such freedom
includes the right not to behave according to the dictates of a pre-defmed con-
ception of female and male identities. Therefore, the recognition of freedom
that Comell advocates protects our right to represent our own sexuality, pro-
motes our emancipation from any sexual options that the State might impose,
and facilitates our struggle against the frequent reinfQrcement of common and
unifying patterns by the basic institutions of society.
Having analyzed the idea of freedom, Comell is ready to take the second
step in the argument, that is, to consider the kind of equality that will allow us
to exercise our freedom. To this purpose, she engages in a lively discussion of
a great variety ofloday's hot issues, for example, the regulation ofprostitution,
the rights of rental mothers and of adopted children, the reform of family law,
the reactionary father's movement, the rights and duties ofparents, and the ifi-
temational agenda of human rights. Comell is conscious that the theoretical
framework she employs does not determine a unique position in relation lo
each ofthese issues, for the same ideal offreedom andprotection ofthe imagi-
nary sphere could give rise to opposite views about them. However, she claims
that universalizing the sphere of the imaginary contributes tirmly to the dis-
carding of stereotypical answers. The hope being that, by giving a fresh impe-
tus to the traditionallines of debate, new foundations for future dialogues could
21 Comell, At the Heart of ... , 18.
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be established. Her reflections are a good proof of what she hopes foro The
great advantage of her approach is that it helps clear the path of stagnant per-
spectives. Clearly, some old themes deserve new approaches. For, ifwe really
conceive of freedom as related to the self-determination of one's goals in life
and the ability to pursue them, then we will have a powerful tool to test gender
equality. After all, it is still the case that most women do not enjoy equal access
with men to the same opportunities, resources, and means to develop their ca-
pabilities in line with the recognition of their personality, and with respect to
their chosen ways of life. Definitely, the strength of this thesis continues to be
revolutionary.
Freedom versus happiness
Ibus, Kant's influence on Comell shows in her emphasis on freedom, self-
determination, and autonomy, as well as in her consideration of the imaginary
sphere as the empty space, which each subject fills on his/her own. The fact
that women have historically been denied, in theory as well as in practice, the
appropriation of these concepts, makes necessary to continue to reflect on them
and to demand that their application be universal. In my view, this aspect of
Comell's' appeal to Kant is impeccable. However, two aspects of Comell's
exposition are not coherent with a Kantian perspective.
First, Comell seems to take freedom for granted, as if it were an onto-
logical feature of any human being. By contrast, Kant conceives of freedom as
a condition of possibility for morality; it is neither a given ontological feature
nor an ideal to be fulfilled by social conditions.
In Kant's view, the existence offreedom canoot be guaranteed; we rather
have to suppose it for morality to be possible. It is just this point that is the
transcendental element of Kant's theory, which ought not to be overlooked.
(More technically, we would say that freedom is a ''postulate of reason", a
"transcendental condition ofpossibility" for morality).
Second, in Kant's approach, freedom has nothing to do with the agent's
search for happiness but, quite on the contrary, with her duty to act morally.
Ibat means that we have to assume that the moral agent is free to preserve her
autonomy, in other words, to warrant that she can give to herself a rule of con-
duct independently of her inclinations. Freedom is not the capacity to do what
we feellike doing; but the capacity not to do what we feel like doing. Ibis is
precisely the formal universalist element of Kant's theory, which should also
not be disregarded.
Being oblivious to these two essential Kantian premises, Comell too fre-
quently considers that free agency of the subject contributes to her enjoyrnent
of happiness; that lo acknowledge the agent's freedom will facilitate her ful-
fillment of welfare. Unfortunately. such a perspective corresponds, however,
253
more to a consequentialist program of general welfare a la Mill than to a formal
universalist ethics such as Kantian is.
The fact that Comell strays flOm Kant on these two essential points must
be stressed, as it is a good example of what has become a too readily accepted
version of Kant among ferninists. We may now ask, in what way is the cate-
gorical imperative an extremely helpful tool in the development of ethical
ferninism?
Ethical ferninism
Notice, first, that the terminological altemative that we have just employed, is
not a secondary issue; that is, that there are good reasons to prefer the term
"ethical ferninism" to the more common "feminist ethics".22 For the notion of
"feminist ethics" seems to imply that there is a type of ethics that is feminist
and another type, which would also be legitimate and deserve to be called eth-
ics, that would, however, not be ferninist.
It would therefore be possible to imagine something like a non feminist
ethics. In contrast, the notion of "ethical feminism" is based on the idea that
any moral theory ought to fulfill some requisites regarding the kind of treat-
ment that women would obtain in such perspective. In short, if it really is eth-
ics, then is has to be feminist. '
Now, given the complexity ofhuman affairs and their intricate relations,
the plOject of ethical feminism acquires its unique lOle by assuming as a theo-
retical priority the need lo analyze the implications that anY moral theory has
for women, and also because it aspires to help design and implement labor, po-
litical, social and jurídical measures to put an end to the still too frequent dis-
crirnination (it would be redundant to add "moral" here) ofwomen.
Furthermore, in this concrete case (the construction of a moral feminism
a la Kant; that is, universal) the expression "ethical feminism" is favored over
"feminist ethics" to emphasize that it is not necessary to start flOm the hy-
pothesis of an assumed difference conceming the moral reasonings and behav-
iors of each gender, as care ethics sustains. We do not need to assume either a
specifically ferninine mode of reasoning and moral action, nor a corresponding
masculine version. Instead, the starting point of "ethical feminism" is the ir-
relevance of considering the agent's gender when judging his or her moral ac-
tion. Interestingly enough, this is not the same as saying that the analysis must
be blind or indifferent to the genders of the implied agents, for it is precisely
when we take them into account that asymmetries in the moral treatment of
each comes to light.
221 take this insight from Celia Amorós (2000): Presentación. In: Celia Amorós (Ed.)
Feminismo y filosofía. Madrid: Síntesis 9-10.
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A formal rule tbat is botb radically universalist and strictly individualizing
Certainly, Kant's moral philosophy can be of much relevance to tbe feminist
understanding of equality. Kant's treatment oftbe relationship between human
good and human freedom serves to illustrate tbe kind of moral justification tbat
underlies tbe feminist claim for equality. As we have seen, Kant distinguishes
between tbe fact tbat everyone aims for happiness and conceives it in a particu-
lar way, from tbe cornmand tbat tbe agent ought lo be free when acting morallY
(Le., tbat she ought not to consider tbe implications for her happiness when de-
ciding how to act morally right). In Kantian terms, tbe only right motive for
moral action is duty, not tbe search for happiness. Even ifher own happiness is
never a proper motive in moral deliberation, tbe agent is nevertbeless obliged
to take into account tbe otber's happiness. In fact, it is only by putting into
brackets our inclinations lowards happiness tbat we exercise OUT freedom, tbat
is to say, tbat we can reason and act independendy of OUT situation, interests,
desires, hopes, needs, etc. Only under tbat condition does tbe moral precept to
respect tbe otber's happiness make sense.
Why tben is Kantian tbought powerful for feminism? Because it justifies
tbat tbe promotion ofa woman's happiness be a reason to act,23 Naturally, this
tbesis must be correcdy understood. The point is not, as Comell seems to have
taken, tbat tbe female agent is allowed to pursue her own happiness; ratber tbat
any agent is obliged (when acting morally right) to help others achieve tbeir
happiness, irrespective oftbeir gender. Hence, tbe requirement tbat tbe agent's
actions ought to be autonomous, together witb tbe acknowledgement oftbe role
tbat happiness plays in human lives, turn tbe categorical imperative into an ex-
tremely helpful tool to analyze and evaluate gender issues.
Application of tbe categorical imperative to the evaluation of gender issues
When we apply tbis imperative in tbe analysis of practical matters from the
perspective of gender, we realize how different tbe treatment of tbe genders is.
For once again social, economical, political, religious and cultural studies show
tbat when tbe otber is a woman, she does not receive the respect, recognition
and resources to promote her self-determinated idea of welfare and happiness
in life as does a mano In tbis respect, Kantian etbics is beneficial for feminism,
not only because it helps diagnose a wound tbat is still open, but especially be-
cause it contributes to the kind of conceptual and moral treatment that would
be néeded to heal it. The appeal to tbe categorical imperative reveals numerous
defects in tbe treatment that women obtain based on their gender. This project
23 Hqta Nagl-Docekal (1997): o.c. 101-124.
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like would focus on the following two essential aspects of the moral law.24
First, the duty to respect the ends that others detennine for themselves (as long
as they are subject to certain morallimitations). In general, because ofthe gen-
der roles assigned lo them, women are presented with limited options, and
therefore offered less opportunities of personal fulfillment. For example,
women, unlike men, must frequently choose between career and family, or are
forced to endure greater tensions and devote more effort to maintain both pro-
jects than do men. To a large extent, it is precisely in relation lo body matters,
sexual identity, maternity, and work issues that women gain or loose our right
to imagine who we want to become.
Second, the precept lo contribute to the fulfillment of other being's self-
determinated ends. This aspect of the categorical imperative forces us to ask to
what extent women fmd support in their individual search for happiness.
Clearly, women do not have equal access lo the opportunities that they deserve.
It is in this context that political measures like affirmative action and quota
regulation acquire their moral justification, as do attempts to (ideally) assist
women to live the kind of life each chooses. Women's liberation envisioned a
new world where women could blossom into full self-realization. We still have
a long way to go on that journey. The future awaits its foundation. To pre-empt
the objection that such a project would be utopian (in the sense ofunfeasible),
it must be emphasized that the moral standard to evaluate women's situation, in
general terros, would be that they receive the same treatment, as do men, no
more or less. So the judgment is by comparison with men' s actual situation, not
an ideal.
A final word of caution
Undoubtedly, the inclusion of the other's ends among my own is a beautiful
definition of love, which can lead to further moral and political analysis and
conclusions. However, it is still an open question whether political action can
and should be built upon this premise. After aIl, it may be that the ethical con-
sequences could (or not) be considered an excessive duty. But that can only be
the topic of another essay.
24 For a more detailed account ofthe application ofthe categorical imperative to the analysis
ofhot gender issues, see Recta Nagl-Docekal, o.c.
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